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FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER PRIVATE SUITS ALLEGING
VIOLATIONS OF STOCK EXCHANGE RULES
INTRODUCTION
The New York Stock Exchange was originally organized and op-
erated as a private club, within the confines of which members were
generally free from state and federal regulation.' The right to par-
ticipate in Exchange activities was treated as a privilege that was ex-
tended by the Exchange to the investing public. 2 Investors were thus
afforded virtually no protection from deceptive or fraudulent prac-
tices on the Exchange. Members often took advantage of this lack of
protective regulation to engage in secret activities, thereby artificially
inducing a trend in securities prices on which Exchange insiders could
then speculate and profit.' It was with an eye towards such abuse that
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933' and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. 5
Under the 1934 Act, Congress created the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to oversee the securities industry.° To supple-
ment SEC supervision, the Act also provided that exchanges, as a pre-
condition to registration, must adopt regulations to encourage con-
duct on the part of its members consistent with "just and equitable
principles of trade." The imposition of this duty of exchange self-
regulation was approved by the Supreme Court in Silver v. New York
Stock Exchanges The duty of self-regulation imposed on the exchanges
complements the duty of investor protection also created by the Se-
curities Acts. 9 It was these twin duties which first provided private par-
' Comment, 44 TUI.ANE L. REV. 633, 635-36 (1970). See also W. DOUGLAS,
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 67 (1940),
Belton v. Hatch, 109 N.Y. 593, 596, 17 N.E. 225, 226 (1888).
See generally W. DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 72.
15 U.S.C. § 77a (1970).
3 Id. § 78a.
" Id. § 78w.
I Id. § 78f(b). Fur the text of 6(b) see note 50 infra.
373 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1961). See also Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange
Member: Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1120, 1124 n.23
(1970), where the authors list several advantages and disadvantages of self-regulation.
In favor of this policy, the authors note that it (I) does not require an expanded gov-
ernmental bureaucracy, (2) is less cumbersome than a governmental bureaucracy, (3) is
more practical, (4) puts the industry directly in the regulatory process, and (5) is condu-
cive to the development of ethical standards. Id. Arguments against self-regulation in-
clude: (1) businessmen do not want to regulate themselves; (2) the scheme merely re-
places a large governmental bureaucracy with an equally cumbersome and more costly
business bureaucracy;, and (3) the policy requires the SEC to be an overseer, resulting in
duplication. Id.
Silver, 373 U.S. at 352. See Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied
Private Rights of Action Under the Exchange Act—Authority af the Administrative Agency to Ne-
gate; Existence for Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. REs, L. REV. 925, 967-68
(1966): "In addition to the general rule requiring adherence to just and equitable prin-
ciples of trade ... the self-regulators have many other rules, some of which overlap
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ties with a basis for federal jurisdiction in suits brought against stock
exchanges. Thus, it was early established that the federal courts ac-
quired subject matter jursidiction when a private party alleged a fail-
ure by an exchange to ensure that its members act in a manner con-
sistent with the duty of investor protection, specified in the Act.'°
In recent years, however, a new jurisdictional issue has arisen
concerning the securities laws; namely, whether a private party may
maintain an action in federal court for violation of a stock exchange
rule. This issue has spawned a variety of approaches. One line of
reasoning holds that there is no express jurisdictional grant for such
actions in the Act itself, and the courts will not imply one, unless the
private party satisfies the heavy burden of persuading the court that
the exchange rule allegedly violated by the company has been ac-
cepted by the SEC as a substitute for Commission action. This ap-
proach is exemplified by the Second Circuit's decision in Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Bathe & Co." A second approach does not emphasize the
express statutory provisions, but instead asks only if the rule allegedly
violated is designed primarily for investor protection. The decision of
the ,Seventh Circuit in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc." is typical of this approach. Each approach has been followed by
several courts," resulting in a degree of confusion in the area. It has
also been suggested that a combination of these two approaches would
be helpful." The Second Circuit has recently attempted such a synthe-
sis, in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co." This decision adopts what appears
to be a compromise solution to the question of federal jurisdiction for
violations of stock exchange rules. In Van Gernert, Colonial's emphasis
on the statutory language, and Buttrey's reliance on the policy of inves-
tor protection have been combined to produce a solution to the juris-
with the section 6(b) rule, adopted primarily for the protection of investors.... Ex-
changes also sign listing agreements with companies listing their securities for trading.
The agreements contractually bind the issuer to do certain things (such as make prompt
disclosure of material events) for the benefit of investors, and exchange policies or
guides are often implemented so as to give investors additional protections."
" Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
" 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). For a discussion of
Colonial, see text at notes 27-49 infra.
"410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1960). For a discussion of
Buttrey, see text at notes 90-103 infra.
13
 For cases following the Colonial approach, see e.g., Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), af['d on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
For cases following the Buttrey approach, see e.g., SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Avern Trust v. Clark, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.A 92,441 (7th Cir. 1969); Stevens v. Abbot, Proctor &
Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968). For the view that Buttrey and Colonial are not
inconsistent, see Bush v. Bruns Nordeman & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP.193, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
14 See Gordon v. DuPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 487 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1973), dis-
cussed in note 132 infra.
" 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,	 U.S.	 , 96 S. Ct. 364 (1975).
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dictional issue that is at once workable and analytically sound. Van
Gernert incorporates the broad duty of protecting investors as the sus-
taining force behind a procedural framework giving exclusive federal
jurisdiction to all private suits alleging a breach of stock exchange
rules.
This comment will examine the historical development of im-
plied civil liabilities under the 1934 Act for violation of a stock ex-
change rule. It will begin by evaluating the existence and desirability
of federal subject matter jurisdiction to hear such private suits. The
Colonial and Buttrey tests will then be explored to determine the im-
pact and effect of the Van Gernert decision, which gives the federal
courts jurisdiction to hear every private suit of this nature and thus
provides a supplementary manner of supervising the securities field.
I. IMPLI ED  STATUTORY JURISDICTION:
THE COLONIAL SUBSTITUTION TEST
The Colonial, Buttrey and Van Gernert approaches all have at their
foundation section 27 of the 1934 Act," the basis for jurisdiction in
securities cases. Section 27 provides:
The district courts of the United States ... shall have ex-
clusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and ac-
tions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created
by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder . . . .' 7
The Second Circuit's approach in Colonial was one of strict interpreta-
tion of section 27. This approach reasons that since Congress pro-
vided for express civil remedies in sections 9(e)," 16(b)" and 18 20 of
the 1934 Act the failure to do so in the other sections of the Act, such
as section 27, was intentional, leaving enforcement of these areas sole-
ly to the control of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 21
If Congress had intended private civil remedies for the violation of
exchange rules, it would have expressly so provided; because no such
provision appears, Congress must be deemed to have decided against
such actions.22
" 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
"Id. Although some courts have accepted the § 27 grant of jurisdiction with lit-
tle comment, see, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 422 (N.D. Cal.
1968), it is a complex matter which has generated much concern. See generally Hoblin, A
Stock Broker's Implied Liability to its Customer for Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock Ex-
change, 39 FoRni-tAm L. REV. 253 (1970); Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock
Exchange Rules, 66 Comm. L. REV. 12 (1966); Shipman, supra note 9; Wolfson & Russo,
supra note 8.




 Lowenfels, supra note 17, at 18.
" Id.
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An extension of this argument is that since certain sections of
the 1934 Act specifically distinguish among the Act itself, rules prom-
ulgated by the SEC, and rules promulgated by the exchanges in ac-
cordance with the Act," while section 27 makes no such distinction,
an implication may be drawn that Congress in enacting section 27 in-
tended to omit a violation of the exchange rules as a basis of
jurisdiction. 24 Such restrictive interpretation of statutory language has
been generally criticized by the Supreme Court." The federal courts
have found little difficulty in avoiding this approach to imply a civil
remedy in analogous cases involving other sections of the Act."
In Colonial, plaintiffs claimed that Bache & Co., a securities
broker, had violated certain exchange rules" and in so doing had
acted in a manner inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade, in violation of sections 6(b) 28 and 15A(b)(7)29 of the 1934 Act. 3 °
The district court dismissed the securities claim, though it granted
Colonial's motion for an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit. 3 '
The issue on appeal was whether the complaint established a federal
question under the Act upon which jurisdiction could be based. 32 This
was the first time that a circuit court was faced with the question of
whether the allegation of' a violation of a stock exchange rule was suf-
ficient to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction under the Act.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint. 33
 The court first pointed to the absence in section 27 of an
express cause of action for violation of a stock exchange rule." The
court next contrasted the explicit reference to "any provision of this
title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an
" Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78f, with id. § 78e and id. § 78cca.
" Lowenfels, supra note 17, at 18.
23 E.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
" See, e.g., J.I. Case Cu. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp. 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961);
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
22
 The claim was based on alleged violations of Article XIV of the Exchange
Constitution, section 2(a) of the By-Laws, and Article III, section 1 of the Rules of Fair
Practice, promulgated by the NASD. 358 F.2d at 179-80. Colonial alleged that Bache
had misinformed the plaintiff corporation, in that the broker had said that Colonial's
margin account was below the Exchange's required minimum. Also alleged was a claim
that Bache had overcharged on debit balances. 358 F.2d at 179 n.l.
28
 For the full text of 6(b), see note 50 infra.
28
 This section has been renumbered and is now § l5A(b)(8), 15 U.S.C.
78o-3(b)(8) (1970).
38 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1970).
31
 358 F.2d at 180. The district court amended its order dismissing the federal
questions to allow Colonial to appeal the order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), be-
cause it involved a controlling question of law. 358 F.2d at 180.
32
 358 F.2d at 180.
32 Id. at 184.
34
 Id. at 181.
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exchange required thereby" in section 29(a) of the Act," with the lack
of a similar reference to exchange rules in section 27. 36
Finding no explicit grant of jurisdiction, the court proceeded to
determine whether it had authority under the Act to imply a remedy.
The court acknowledged the duty of the federal courts to effectuate
the purposes of the Act." Noting, however, the breadth of the section
6(b) mandate that exchange rules promote conduct in accordance with
"just. and equitable principles of trade," the court stated that it could
not assume that Congress had intended the exchanges to be held re-
sponsible to such an amorphous standard. 38
 In an attempt to better
define the standard, the court sought to balance the twin congres-
sional goals of industry self-regulation and investor protection. Lean-
ing too far in concern for the investor might result in the absurdity of
giving a right of recovery for violation of any and all rules, including
simple "housekeeping rules."3 " The court viewed congressional re-
liance on exchange self-regulation as indicative of an intent not to au-
tomatically allow civil suits. 4 " The court finally settled on the solution
that breach of a stock exchange rule would serve as a basis for juris-
diction if the rule were shown to be "a substitute for regulation by the
SEC itself."'" The rules involved here were held not to be such
substitutes.'" Nonetheless, the court's test clearly suggested that viola-
tion of some rules would result in civil liability.
Apart from these problenis of statutory interpretation, a more
practical policy concern undoubtedly affected the Colonial result. This
was the fear expressed by the court that implying federal civil liability
for violations of exchange rules would open the federal courts to a
flood of litigation," removing from arbitration or the state courts
many controversies which belonged there. 44
 The court was therefore
hesitant to deaf in an expansive manner with the jurisdictional issue.'"
The Second Circuit did not suggest any objective test to aid in
determining whether an exchange rule is a substitute for SEC
33 15	 § 78cca (1970) (emphasis added).
3' See text at note 17 supra.
37 358 F.2d at 181.
3° Id.
s" Id. al 182. See also Lowenfels, supra note 17, at 28-29.
4" 358 17 .2c1 at 181.
" Tillie court must look to the nature of the particular rule and its place in the
regulatory scheme, with the party urging the implication of a federal liability carrying a
considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when the violation is of the statute or a
SEC regulation." Id.
4' "We find little reason to believe that by requiring exchanges and dealers' as-
sociations to include such provisions [catch-all rules which allow exchanges flexibility in
minding their own houses] in their rules Congress meant to impose a new legal stan-
dard on members ... ." Id.
""Moreover, mere recitation of the statutory watchword by an aggrieved inves-
tor would saddle the federal courts with garden-variety customer-broker suits ... ." Id.
at 183.
' 4 1d. at 18'1 -83.
1 ' Id.
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action." One commentator has suggested a two-part test: (1) Has the
SEC declined to act in the particular area, on the condition that each
exchange promulgate its own rule governing the same subject matter?
(2) Has the SEC promulgated a rule, applicable only to non-members,
which regulates the same conduct as a similar exchange rule applica-
ble to members? Where both these conditions are satisfied, the ex-
change rule would then be considered a substitute, the breach of
which would give rise to civil liability. 47 An affirmative answer to
either one of these questions will show that an exchange rule may be a
substitute for SEC action." Another commentator has suggested a
similar three-part test: (1) Is the rule explicitly required or permitted
by the Commission? (2) Is the rule implicitly traceable to specific
statutory provisions? (3) Is the rule reasonably explicit and related to
the goal of investor protection? Proof of these factors would establish
substitution."
A better approach to the substitution question may be based on
the broad language of section 6(b) 50 and an understanding of the re-
lationship between the SEC and the exchanges with regard to the
promulgation of rules. Section 6 provides for the registration of
exchanges." A prerequisite of registration is that each exchange adopt
rules of conduct governing its members consistent with "just and
equitable principles of trade" and provide for disciplinary action in
the event that a member violates these rules. 52 At the same time that
•it enacted section 6(b), Congress also authorized the SEC to promul-
gate its own rules." SEC rules are included in the section 27 jurisdic-
tional grant, since they are promulgated pursuant to the Act. 54 The
48 "[T]tle court must look to the matter of the particular rule and its place in the
regulatory scheme .... The case for implication would be strongest when the rule im-
poses an explicit duty unknown at common law." Id. at 182.
47 Shipman, supra note 9, at 1007.
43 Id.
43 Wolfson & Russo, supra note 8, at 1136-42.
5° Section 6(b) provides:
No registration shall be granted or remain in force unless the rules of the
exchange include provision for the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining
of a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equita-
ble principles of trade, and declare that the willful violation of any provi-
sions of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder shall be consid-
ered conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles
of trade.
15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970).
51
 Section 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1970).
52 1d.
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s, 78w (1970).
54 See id. The exercise of this discretionary authority has been limited. See W.
DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 66: "(ON all the rules now in force ... not one was formally
adopted by this Commission. True, their adoption by the Exchange was at the sugges-
tion of the Commission but only after full consultation with the Exchange. And in no
case where the Exchange refused to act did the Commission promulgate its own rule.
In short, all of them are the Exchange's rules, enforceable primarily by it." For a more
recent statement acknowledging this sparing use by the SEC of its discretionary author-
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SEC was also given the option of declining to promulgate a particular
rule until after the exchanges have been given the opportunity to
make their own, which must then be subjected to critical examination
and approval by the SEC. 55
If the SEC explicitly approves and implements an exchange rule,
the practical effect is the same as if the SEC had itself promulgated
the rule. Similarly, if the SEC fails to disapprove an exchange rule, it
has arguably authorized the rule by implication. 58
 It is therefore sub-
mitted that, whether explicitly or implicitly approved by the SEC, an
exchange rule should be given the same weight as a SEC rule. It
should thus be included in the jurisdictional grant of section 27, and a
breach of the rule should result in civil liability."
This expansive approach contrasts with the Colonial approach
whereby only explicitly adopted exchange rules may be covered by
section 27. However, the notion of expanding jurisdiction for suits al-
leging violation of exchange rules comports well with one of the goals
of the 1934 Act: self-regulation by the exchanges. The Supreme
Court stressed the importance of self-regulation by stock exchanges in
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 58
 an action brought by a non-member
against the Exchange, alleging a violation of the Sherman Act." Al-
though holding that the Exchange's action in this case was violative of
the antitrust laws, the Court stated that not all actions otherwise illegal
under the Sherman Act would be held to be illegal if performed by
the Exchange." This is because the "federally mandated duty of
self-policing by exchanges"" compels the exchanges to adopt certain
policies which might otherwise be suspect. Exchange actions would,
however, be subject to measurement against a standard which com-
bines both statutory aims; that is, it must be shown that the actions arc
ity, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v, Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 129-30
(1973).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s, 78w.
59
 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) provides that: "The Commission is authorized and directed to
make a study and investigation ... of exchange rules to determine their adequacy in
protecting investors." (Emphasis added.) See also Silver, 373 U.S. at 357.
5 ? See W. DOUGLAS supra note 1, at 82:
[T]he national securities exchanges should be so organized as to be able to
take on the job of policing their members so that it would be unnecessary
for the Government to interfere with that business and that they should
demonstrate by action that they were so organized. Now, that is something
more than cooperation. That is letting the exchanges take the leadership
with Government playing a residual role. Government would keep the
shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready
for use but with the hope it would never have to be used.
58
 373 U.S. 341 (1961). Douglas' "shotgun" quote, see note 57 .supra, was cited
approvingly. Id. at 352.
59
 Id. at 360-61.
6° The Exchange revoked temporary approval of private telephonic connections
arranged between plaintiffs and members of the Exchange; the Exchange denied
Silver's repeated requests for an explanation of this action. id. at 343-46.
6 ' Id. at 356-57.
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regulatory and are protective of investors, and that they do not abso-
lutely offend the antitrust Iaws. 62
 To ensure this, "Nome form of re-
view of exchange self-policing, whether by administrative agency or by
the courts, is therefore not at all incompatible with the fulfillment of
the aims of the Securities Exchange Act." 63 An expansive treatment of
the substitution question is supportive of this approach, since if it can
be shown that a particular rule has been explicitly or implicitly ap-
proved by the SEC; that rule will have much more authority and will
better serve as a source of private enforcement input.
II. DUTIES AND LIABILITIES: BUTTREY AND INVESTOR PROTECTION
The Seventh Circuit, in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.," adopted an approach which concentrates on the exis-
tence of a duty owed to the investor by the exchange. The source of
this duty is section 6(b), which mandates that exchanges encourage
behavior by listed firms in accordance with 'just and equitable princi-
ples of trade."'" Jurisdiction thus exists under section 27, which pro-
vides jurisdiction to enforce "any liability or duty created by this title or
the rules and regulations thereunder . . "68
Baird v. Franklin" was the first case in which a court found a
duty under section 6 on the part of exchanges to discipline errant
members. Plaintiffs brought an action against the New York Stock Ex-
change for damages suffered when a member-firm failed. The thrust
of the complaint was that the exchange had neglected to ascertain that
the member-firm was embezzling the plaintiffs' securities and that
upon discovery of this breach of fiduciary duty the exchange did not
discipline the member." The district court found no duty owed to the
plaintiffs by the Exchange and dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction."
The Second Circuit reversed the district court and held that
66 Id. at 357.
63 Id. at 359 (emphasis added). This leads to the conclusion that federal courts do
have jurisdiction under § 27 for actions involving violations of security exchange rules.
Yet the question remains why Congress, if it so intended, did not explicitly provide for
civil remedies. It is this incongruity which made the statutory-based arguments an un-
satisfactory basis of jurisdiction for the Second Circuit in Colonial. It appears, however,
that the Second Circuit assumed that jurisdiction does exist for such suits, in reaching
its recent decision in Van Gernert. See text at notes i 3357 infra.
64
 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th Cir.), cm. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
°' 15 U.S.C. 781(b).
66 Id. § 78aa (1970) (emphasis added).
67
 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
66
 Plaintiffs brought the action on two distinct theories of recovery. One was that,
on learning that a member had violated certain exchange rules, the Exchange became
liable For its failure to take disciplinary action towards the member. The second was
that plaintiffs were third party beneficiaries of the agreement filed by defendant with
the SEC in accordance with section 6(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(I). 141 F.2d at 242.
"9
 141 F.2d at 243.
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there was such a duty. 7° The court decided, however, that although
the Exchange had failed in its duty, there was no ultimate liability be-
cause this failure was not a proximate cause of plaintiffs' loss." Judge
Clark dissented in part from the result but agreed that the exchanges
were bound to regulate the conduct of their members.'" The gist of
Judge Clark's reasoning was that section 6 would be meaningless un-
less section 6(b) "is construed as imposing the twofold duty of enact-
ing certain rules and regulations and or seeing that they are
enforced."'"
Baird thus established that section 6(b) raised a duty of investor
protection, which could be enforced against the exchanges in federal
court under section 27. 74 The approach taken by the court necessarily
involved the existence of a class to be protected (the investing public),
a type of harm from which this class is to be protected (violations of
Stock Exchange rules), and a remedy for that harm (civil liability).
The question of whether the duty of investor protection encom-
passes third parties other than the exchanges was first addressed by
the Supreme Court in j.l. Case Co. v. Borak. 75 Plaintiffs brought suit
against the J.I. Case Company alleging a violation of section I4(a) of
the 1934 Act." It was alleged that the plaintiff shareholders were de-
prived of their preemptive rights when the defendant effected a
merger by circulating a false and misleading proxy statement." The
district court held that its jurisdiction was limited to granting de-
claratory relief, and that it could not award private damages." The
circuit court reversed, holding that the district court was empowered
to award such relief." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a
federal court has jurisdiction to imply remedies that will further the
aims of the Act."
Two considerations influenced the Court's reasoning. First, the
Court noted that investor protection is a primary aim of the Act. 8 ' In
determining whether a breach of the chapter itself may be remedied
by implying jurisdiction for civil suits, the question is thus whether the
" "We accede to the view that the Stock Exchange violated a Linty when it failed
to take disciplinary action." Id.
" Id.
72 Id. at '244.
73 Id.
14 The plaintiff in Colonial had relied on Baird, claiming that it was unreasonable
to limit to an exchange the civil liability that may be implied from 6. It was contended
that such liability should extend to a member firm. 358 F.2d at 181. The court in
Colonial distinguished Baird, however, explaining that Baird turned on a violation of the
1934 Act itself, and not, as in Colonial, on a violation of an exchange rule by an ex-
change member. Id,
46 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
" 15 U.S.C. 78n (1970).
"377 U.S. at 427.
75 Id. at 430.
" florak v. J.1. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 1963).
8 " 377 U.S. at 433.
81 1d. at 431-32.
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implication of jurisdiction will further the goal of investor pro-
tection." That section 14(a) did not specifically provide for private
civil suits was not deemed a barrier. The goal of investor protection
"implies the availability of judicial relief." 83 Second, the court stated
that "[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action."84 The Court therefore declared it
to be "the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." 85
It is important to note that the duty violated in Borak—the pro-
tection of investors—was considered by the Court to be one raised by
the Act itself. Borak dealt only with section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, an
individual provision which is expressly intended for the protection of
investors: "[T]he Commission may prescribe [such rules) as necessary
.., for the protection of investors ...." 86 Thus, it could be argued
that Borak did not declare a principle of general applicability, but was
instead tied to the presence of a specific declaration of congressional
policy. The Supreme Court, however, in such cases as Allen v. State
Board of Elections," has not given Barak such a limited construction. In
Allen, plaintiffs sought declaratory judgments concerning the validity
of certain voting requirements of the states of Mississippi and
Alabama. Plaintiffs alleged that these states had failed to adequately
demonstrate that the enactments complied with federal law. An initial
issue was whether the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the suits,
since section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 88 did not explicitly
provide for private actions. In addition, the Voting Rights Act con-
tains no language so explicitly protective of a class as the language of
section 14(a). In deciding that there was jurisdiction, the
Court—citing Borak—stated: "We have previously held that a federal
statute passed to protect a class of citizens, although not specifically
authorizing members of the protected class to institute suit, neverthe-
less implied a private right of action."88 Thus, the Court has not
linked the Borak analysis to the presence of particular statutory word-
ing.
The Borak reasoning is the foundation of the Buttrey approach.
In Buttrey, the trustee in bankruptcy for a securities dealer brought
suit against Merrill Lynch for allegedly violating Rule 405 of the New
York Stock Exchange, the so-called "know your customer rule.""
Specifically, the trustee alleged that Merrill Lynch had failed to ascer-
tain whether the bankrupt was financially stable before dealing in its
" Id. at 432.
33 Id. (emphasis added).
" Id.
' 5 1d. at 433.
"" 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
" 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
$6 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 (1970).
" Allen, 393 U.S. at 557.
"410 F.2d at 141.
452
EXCHANGE RULE SUITS
securities."' The district court denied defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment with respect to all counts of the claim, including the
federal jurisdictional question." Defendant then sought and obtained
leave to take an immediate interlocutory appeal." The Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed, holding that the alleged violations were actionable,"
and leaving for consideration at trial whether there was in fact a viola-
tion of Rule 405, and whether this violation resulted in plaintiff's
harm."5
In reaching this decision, the court focused on the latter part of
section 27, which grants federal jurisdiction over
all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder. 98
The issue then became whether an exchange rule could raise a duty
cognizable under section 27, so that the federal courts would have
jurisdiction of private suits alleging a violation of the rule." The
Seventh Circuit, relying on Borak, believed that such jurisdiction
existed: 98
There is nothing inconsistent with this Section [27] in hold-
ing that violations of Rule 405 may be actionable as a "duty
created by this chapter" inasmuch as Rule 405 was pro-
mulgated in accordance with Sections 6 and 19 of the Act,
even if Rule 405 is not in itself to be considered a rule
"thereunder."""
The court did not intend to fashion absolute liability for a viola-
tion of Rule 405. It recognized that this rule is capable of both a public
protection function and a "housekeeping" role.'°° The care taken by
the court to limit its discussion of the issue of private suits to the par-
ticular facts surrounding the instant application of Rule 405 indicates
that the Seventh Circuit did not wish to formulate a general doctrine
applicable to all suits alleging violations of stock exchange rules."D 1
" Id. at 137, 141. This omission was aggravated when Merrill Lynch permitted
the bankrupt to change from a case account to a margin account, again without any in-
vestigation of its financial security. The bankrupt began to speculate in stock transac-
tions and defendants failed to properly supervise the account. The various losses sus-
tained resulted in the bankruptcy. Id. at 141,
" 2 1d. at 136.
"s
" Id. at 142.
15 14. at 143.
m 15 U.S.C. § 'Nail (1970).
"410 F.2d at 143.
58 Id.
"Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
'°° Id. at 141. See Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66
COLUM, L. REV. 12, 24-25 (1966), for a discussion of housekeeping rules.
410 F.2d at 142.
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The result is that each rule allegedly breached must be examined, as
was Rule 405 in Buttrey, to determine whether it creates a duty in
favor of private parties in light of the policies underlying the 1934
Act. The touchstone for determining whether there is federal jurisdic-
tion for suits involving a specific rule is thus the rule's design for the
protection of investors. 102 As in Colonial, the question of jurisdiction
depends on a case-by-case analysis; the difference is that under
Buttrey, the burden of persuasion is less, because the plaintiff need not
show that the rule at issue is a substitute for SEC action." 3
Significantly, the Colonial question of whether the statute ex-
pressly creates a right of action 104
 becomes irrelevant under the
Buttrey approach. Through the twin congressional aims of self-
regulation and investor protection, an area of duty is established
which serves as the jurisdictional basis for an implied action. 105 Within
this area the exchanges and the Commission are each charged with
policing exchange members.'" The non-housekeeping rules of the
exchanges are standards of care by which the members are to be
judged. It follows that the investor, for whose protection the Act is in-
tended, and upon whom the various alleged harms devolve, may sup-
plement the action of the exchanges and Commission through private
suits.'" The jurisdictional basis for private suits is implied in Buttrey
from a duty "raised by the Act." The net result is a less conservative,
more result-oriented interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act
than was accorded by the Second Circuit in Colonial. toe
an Id.
"3 In Buttrey, the court cited Colonial, but only for the narrow proposition that
some rules may play an integral part in SEC regulation. Id. at 142. For critical compari-
sons of these two cases, see, e.g., Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to its Customer for
Violation of a Rule of Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAM L. REV, 253, 276 (1970);
Comment, MAINE L. REV. 378, 393 (1974)) Comment, 1969, U. ILL L. F. 551, 559-60;
Note, U. PA. L. REV. 388, 393 (1973).
"'See text at note 34 supra.
105
 410 F.2d at 142.
'°"1d. at 142-43.
10 ' Id. at 142; see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
I08
 It is unlikely that Buttrey is affected by recent actions of the Supreme Court
aimed at restricting the potentially unlimited application of Barak. In Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975), the Court defined four factors that should be considered in determin-
ing whether a remedy is implicit in a statutory scheme: whether the statute clearly ar-
ticulates a Federal right in the plaintiff, id. at 78; whether there is any explicit or im-
plicit indication of legislative intent either to imply or deny a private remedy, id.;
whether it is consistent with the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy, id.; and
whether the type of action involved is one typically and historically of state concern, id.
See Comment, 17 B.C. IND. COM . L. REV, 53 (1975). In Cort, plaintiff shareholder
brought suit under 19 U.S.C. § 610 (Stipp. III, 1970), which prohibits corporate con-
tributions in connection with any political election. The statute provides only for a crim-
inal penalty; the Court refused to imply a private remedy. 422 U.S. at 85.
The Court, citing Borak, noted that the fact that the statute involved in Cart was
penal in nature did not automatically preclude the implication of a private remedy. Id.
at 79-80. Yet, the absene of any reference to civil actions gave rise to the presumption
that protection of the class of corporate shareholders was at best a subsidiary purpose
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On the other hand, and possibly of even greater significance to
the question of federal jurisdiction, under Buttrey the plaintiff retains
a choice of forums. That is, since federal jurisdiction does not vest
until the determination has been made whether the rule involved is
directly protective of investors, the section 27 provision for exclusive
federal jurisdiction'" does not initially prevent the plaintiff from
bringing suit in a state court. Once it has been decided that the rule al-
legedly violated encapsulates a duty of investor protection, however,
the jurisdiction of the federal courts is exclusive. However, Buttrey
fails to indicate any guidelines as to when or how an exchange rule
may be found to be designed for the protection of investors, as op-
posed to a mere housekeeping rule. The result is that this jurisdic-
tional exclusivity is determined on a case-by-case basis; there is no
general rule governing the question of which forum is primary."°
At best, other courts have tried to de-emphasize the difference
underlying the statute. Id. at 80. There was found no "clearly articulated" right in the
plaintiff. Id. at 82.
Second, if a federal law clearly grants to a class certain rights, it is not necessary
that the statute also create a private cause of action. Id. Vet, where there is no clear
grant or denial of such a right of action, and where it is questionable whether the stat-
ute does give the plaintiff certain rights, the Court will hestitate to assume a legislative
function. Id. at 82-83. The conclusion must then be that the relationship is to be gov-
erned by state law, Id. at 82-84.
Further, the relief requested in Cori was not seen to promote the primary con-
gressional goal in enacting the statute. While recovery might vindicate the plaintiffs
monetary loss, it would do nothing to eradicate the influence exerted by misspent funds
upon the election. Id. at 84. Finally, the Court concluded that the state court system is
the proper forum for private suits of this nature. Plaintiff's claim might be nullified by
applicable state law, id. at 84-85, or there might be additional rights of a state nature
which plaintiff could invoke, such as an action for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 84.
See generally Comment, 17 B.C. INn. Com , L. Rriv. 53 (1975).
Cart would not bar private suits alleging violations of exchange rules. The 1934
Act does create a right in favor of a class. See Barak, 377 U.S. at 432; Baird, 141 F.2d at
239. Legislative intent to imply remedies for injuries suffered within the narrow scope
of the securities laws is also clear. Barak, 377 U.S. at 432. Because such suits are sup-
plementary to SEC enforcement, they are within the purview of the legislative scheme.
Id. It is submitted that federal jurisdiction over private suits in the area of federal se-
curities law ensures uniform national interpretation and delineation of actionable duties.
CI Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc..—F. Supp.—(E.D. Pa.), 44 U.S.L.W. 2149 (Sept.
11, 1975). Exchange rules are, to borrow the Court's words in Core, 422 U.S. at 85,
"clearly an intrusion into the national affairs of corporations; to the extent that state
law differed or impeded suit, the congressional intent could be compromised in state-
created causes of action." Thus, the reliance upon Barak in Buttrey still appears appro-
priate.
10" "The district courts Of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter ... and of' all suits in equity and actions at law ...." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1970).
'" Contrast this approach with the manner in which the Second Circuit in Van
Gernert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.. 1975) separated the initial jurisdictional
issue from the difficult definitional question of "design for investor protection." In Van
Gernert, federal jurisdiction attaches immediately upon allegation of a rule violation; ex-
amination of the rule for its protective function is required only in determining liability.
See text at notes 142-47 infra.
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between the approaches of Colonial and Buttrey.'" At worst, the dif-
ferences have been ignored, or the courts have seized upon "distin-
guishing" aspects of one decision or the other that may in fact be of no
significance.'" Those courts which felt that the liberal Buttrey decision
might be more in line with congressional intent, yet which were mind-
ful of the strict requirements of Colonial, sought facts tantamount to
fraud to give rise to a private civil damage action. " 3 Others found no
difficulty in rejecting civil liability arguments and denying the action
altogether. 14 Thus the existence of federal liability for violations of
exchange rules by listed firms remained uncertain," 5 with many
courts hesitating to accept either approach as controlling.'" The re-
sult was the absence of a definitive statement of the law in this area."r
"I See, e.g., Wells v. Blythe & Co., 351 F. Supp, 999, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Bush
v. Bruns Nordeman & Co., 11972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. Rep. 1 93,674
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
"= See, e.g., McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co., [1972-73 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 93,541, at 92585 n.1 (N.D. III. 1972) (Buttrey viewed as
based on an allegation of Fraud).
l'a Id. See also Wells v. Blythe & Co., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 999, 1000-1001 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-70
Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,748, at 99274-75 (N.D. III. 1970). This is a
misreading of Buttrey, where the presence of action "tantamount to fraud" was to be
weighed when considering liability. 410 F.2d at 143. There was jurisdiction in Buttrey
once it was found that the protective functions of Rule 405 had been violated. Id. at
142. In this respect, see Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969).
1 " See, e.g., McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co., [1972-73 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,541, at 92585 (N.D. III. 1972).
See Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389. F. Supp. 678 (D.
Wyo. 1975).
"5 See Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678
(D. Wyo. 1975); Starkrnan v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Tex.
1969), was a case involving alleged violations of the NASD "suitability rule," Article III,
Section 2, which provides that NASD members shall have a reasonable ground for rec-
ommending the sale or purchase of any security. The court followed Colonial and
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), in concluding that
there is no jurisdiction in federal courts for suits such as these. Critical to this decision
was the breadth of the "suitability rule." Were the court to imply civil liability, it would
be regulating along a much broader spectrum of broker behavior than is involved in
legislative security regulation. Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, supra, at 1163.
Even more chaotic would be the result of judicial review of market judgments. Id.
Mercury was followed in Wells v. Blythe & Co., 351 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Cal.
1972), where the court held that, following the mandate of Colonial, and absent any al-
legations of "fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices," which, apparently, might
lead the court to follow Bullrey's lead, it would grant dismissal of the cause of action
which had been predicated on a federal civil liability theory. Id. at 1002.
Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo.
1975), is a case which was filed in the District Court of Wyoming involving alleged vio-
lations of the same "suitability" rule of the NASD as was involved in Mercury, as well as
violations of Rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange. The court attempted to recon-
cile Colonial and Buttrey, but seemed instead to follow Buttrey, denying a motion to dis-
miss the federal claims based on the alleged violations. Id. at 683. The court still re-
quired action "tantamount to fraud," id., but this would appear to be a misreading of
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III. A SYNTHESIS OF THE COLONIAL AND BUTTREY APPROACHES:
VAN GEMERT
In Van Gemert v. Boeing Co.," 8
 the Second Circuit abandoned the
strict interpretation approach of Colonial and adopted one closer to
that of Buttrey and Borak. The Second Circuit began to retreat from
Colonial in 1970, when it decided Pearlstein v. Scudder & German.'" In
Pearlstein, plaintiff sued defendant securities partnership for damages
allegedly caused by violations of section 7(c) of the 1934 Act 12° and of
Regulation T.' 2 ' Defendant arranged bank loans to help finance the
purchase by plaintiff of convertible bonds. Even with the loans, plain-
tiff failed to tender sufficient cash to purchase the bonds, and defend-
ant extended credit to cover the deficit, 122
 There were indications that
plaintiff knew or should have known that defendant was acting ille-
gally in setting up this credit arrangement.'" The district court held
that plaintiff had the right to maintain the suit but that certain
the Buttrey holding. See note 82 supra. Nonetheless, Geyer found that the only limitations
on allowing private suits under § 27 are that the exchange rule on which suits are based
must not be a "housekeeping" rule, that it be precise, and that it be protective of inves-
tors. Id.
Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), dealt with the question
of whether an alleged violation of exchange rules is sufficient to establish jurisdiction
under the Act so as to avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement. The court noted
that the reference in § 27 to "rules and regulations" might not include exchange rules,
but decided that a violation of these rules might be actionable as a breach of a duty of
care raised by the 1934 Act itself, and cited to Buttrey as authority for this proposition.
Id. at 523. The court then shifted its attention to Colonial, and held that an allegation of
a violation of a rule as concise as the one involved is sufficient to carry the Colonial
burden of persuasion:
The rule which Seroussi is charged with violating is not a broad
generalized one, "something of a catchall" with vague or uncertain con-
tours that may tend itself to variant interpretation, so that it could reason-
ably be argued that it was beyond Congressional purpose that its violation
would give rise to a civil claim under federal law. The rule here is precise
.... Plaintiff's allegations which specify the details of violations of the Stock
Exchange rules ... upon their face are sufficient to confer jurisdiction
under section 27 of the Exchange Act.
Id. at 523-24. The Starkman court thus cited to Colonial for authority as to the burden of
persuasion, H.; but to Buttrey for the broader proposition that an allegation of a viola-
don .of an exchange rule will confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, id. at 523 n.22,
524 n.30. Starkman in this respect presaged Van Gernert, which found that jurisdiction in
such suits always exists. 520 F.2d at 1382.
Starkman also follows Borak by endorsing private suits as an aid to the Commis-
sion in its task of regulating the securities industry. The court noted that suits based on
a violation of a rule aimed at ensuring fair dealing and protection of investors "may be
equated to anti-trust litigation, where plaintiffs have been considered 'private Attorneys
General' ...." Starkman v. Seroussi, supra, at 523.
"" 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, U.S., 96 S. Ct. 364 (1975).
"2
 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
"° 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1970).
1 " 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(2) (1975).
122
 429 F.2d at 1138.
"3 /d,
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stipulations of judgment entered into by the parties regarding the
sum owed defendant by plaintiff were res judicata. 124 The Second
Circuit disagreed with this latter conclusion, but agreed that plaintiff
could maintain the action in federal court.' 25
This decision was based on the court's understanding that pri-
vate suits are an "effective means of protecting the economy as a
whole. ”126 Interestingly, plaintiff's alleged lack of innocence did not
bar recovery. Indeed, this factor was deemed secondary to the goal of
investor protection:
However, our holding does not turn on Pearlstein's subjec-
tive knowledge of the law. In our view the danger of per-
mitting a windfall to an unscrupulous investor is out-
weighed by the salutary policing effect which the threat of
private damages can have upon brokers and dealers above
and beyond the threats of governmental action by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission.'"
In this apparent turnabout, the Second Circuit began a return to that
view of the Act which had earlier prompted its decision in Baird.' 28
Judge Friendly, the author of the strict interpretation decision in
Colonial, dissented. However, even he seemed to recognize that
Colonial was not the answer to the troublesome issue of jurisdiction: "I
recognize that violations of these provisions may give rise to civil
liability in appropriate cases, under any of several theories."'" Judge
Friendly did not advocate a repudiation of Colonial's substitution test,
but he did appear to acknowledge the importance of Buttrey's focus on
investor protection.' 30
 His disagreement with the majority stemmed,
however, from his conclusion that section 7(c) was not enacted for in-
vestor protection purposes: "The economic purpose behind § 7(c) ...
causes the provision to differ from those portions of the securities acts
more directly aimed at protection of investors."'" Nonetheless, this is
far from his strict stance in Colonia1. 132
124 Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 295 F. Supp. 1197, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
m 429 F.2d at 1139.
14 1d. at 1140.
1 " Id. at 1144.
m See text at notes 67-73 supra.
329
 429 F.2d at 1147 (dissenting opinion). "But this is not an appropriate case."
Id.
"° See id. at 1148. "To be sure, it may be proper in some instances to impose civil
liability in furtherance of the subsidiary purpose of § 7(c), protection of the innocent
'Iamb' ...."
"I Id.
132 The Second Circuit in Pearlstein did not succeed in bridging the distance be-
tween itself and the Seventh Circuit. The Fifth Circuit recognized this in Gordon v.
DuPont Glare Forgan Inc., 487 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1973), an action brought by inves-
tors against brokers for allegedly failing to notify plaintiffs that their account was un-
dermargined. The court noted that the Seventh Circuit in Buttrey "has said that other
stock exchange rules will support a private right of action," id. at 1262, and that the
Second Circuit in Pearlstein "has held that a private cause of action exists under the
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In Van Gernert, the Second Circuit completed what it began in
Pearlstein—an integration of its approach to securities act jurisdiction
with that of the Supreme Court in Barak. Plaintiffs were holders of
Boeing debentures purchased under an Indenture Agreement and
listed on the New York Stock Exchange pursuant to a Listing Agree-
ment between Boeing and the Exchange. The Listing Agreement was
in accordance with the Exchange company manual, 133 and provided
that the listed company would publish immediate notice of any action
taken which would affect the rights of the holders of any of its se-
curities, that the company would provide the holders sufficient time to
exercise their rights with regard to the securities, and that the com-
pany would independently notify the Exchange of any such corporate
action.'" On February 28, 1966, Boeing decided to call its
debentures.'" In the subsequent news release the debenture call was
not headlined in its own right, nor did the release contain the re-
quired tentative dates for redemption of the bonds and the expiration
of the conversion rights. 13" Boeing's actions met the formal require-
ments of the Indenture, but not those of the Listing Agreement.'"
initial-purchase margin requirements set out in Regulation T," id. The court concluded
that there was common ground between these two decisions, and that "the way is clear,
we are told, to synthesize the two holdings and imply a right of action under the stock
exchange rules setting margin maintenance standards." Id, However, here too the court
was faced with the plaintiff's prior knowledge, and with "all due deference to the Sec-
ond Circuit" held, narrowly, that nun-innocent investors cannot recover for violations of
stock exchange rules. Id. at 1263.
In On July 15, 1958 Boeing offered its shareholders the right to buy $100 of
convertible debentures fbr each 23 shares of stock owned. The debentures payed 414%
interest per annum, and were convertible at a rate of two shares for each $100 of de-
bentures. The Chase Manhattan Bank was appointed trustee. 520 F.2d at 1375. The
113-page Indenture Agreement, the Listing Agreement, the prospectus, and the regis-
tration statement for the debentures, as well as the debentures themselves, all provided
for the potential redemption by Boeing of the debentures, and for notice of a redemp-
tion call. Id.
I " 'To insure coverage which will adequately inform the public, the news
should be released to at least one or more newspapers of general circu-
lation in New York City which regularly. publish financial news, or to
one or more of the national newswire services (Associated Press, United
Press International), in addition to such other release as the company
may elect to make.'
Id. at 1376-77.
195 Boeing released this news to the newspapers in a general article dealing with
sales and net earnings of 1965, a possible stock increase, stock split, and post-split div-
idends. Id. at 1377.
1 " On March 2 Boeing fixed March 29„1966 as the date for the expiration of
the conversion privilege, with April 8 as the redemption date. It was not until March 7,
1966 that Boeing notified the Exchange of these pertinent dates. Id.
"' It was not contested that the requirements of the Indenture were met by the
Company. Id. at 1377. Boeing admitted that its publication failed to meet the standard
demanded by the Listing Agreement, as defined by Section A10 of the Exchange
"Company Manual": "'Publicity: The term "publicity" ... as used in the listing agree-
ment in respect of redemption action, refers to a general news release, and not to the
formal notice or advertisement of redemption sometimes required by provisions of an
indenture or charter .... Such news release shall be made as soon as possible after
459
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The fifty-six named plaintiffs claimed that Boeing had failed to
give adequate notice of the conversion cal1. 138 The gravamen of the
complaint was that Boeing was civilly liable under federal law for vio-
lating exchange rules (contained in the Exchange Listing Agreement
and Section A10 of the Company Manual) which were promulgated
pursuant to section 6 of the Act. 13 " The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York found that Boeing had com-
plied with the notice provisions of the Indenture, and that even if Boe-
ing had violated the Listing Agreement, this did not establish subject
matter jurisdiction in the federal courts.' 4 °
On appeal, the Second Circuit was thus once again confronted
with the question whether the allegation of a breach of a stock ex-
change rule or regulation is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction under
section 27. Mindful of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Buttrey, and its
own recent decision in Pearlstein, the court was apparently ready to re-
treat from its strict holding in Colonial. The court held that Boeing
had failed to give reasonable and adequate notice of the redemption
to the debenture holders."'
The first question examined was whether there was jurisdiction
to hear the suit. The analysis began with the statement that "[title List-
ing Agreement and Company Manual are 'instruments corresponding'
to rules of the Exchange within Section 6(a)(3) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934."" 2 After a brief inquiry into the historical per-
spectives of the jurisdictional question,' 43 the court invoked Borak for
the proposition that private litigants may bring both derivative and di-
rect actions for breach of the 1934 Act and SEC rules.' 44 The Second
Circuit interpreted Colonial as having recognized that such suits were
deemed to lie also for a breach of an exchange rule which was in-
tended to directly protect investors. 143 Emphasis was placed on the
corporate action which will lead to, or which looks toward, redemption is taken ... and
shall be made by the fastest available means, i.e., telephone, telegraph or
hand-delivery.' " Id. at 1376.
' 3° Id. at 1379.
' 35 1d. Jurisdiction was asserted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78a (1970); the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1970); the Trust In-
denture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (1970); and principles of pendent jurisdiction,
see 520 F.2d at 1382 n.19.
10 It was also held that since appellants had failed to convert their debentures,
they had no standing to raise the issue of an illegal conversion rate. 520 F.2d at 1375.
"' Id.
"' Id. at 1380.
' 5 1d.
'" Id.
' 4' Id. The court conceded that this was stated in dictum in Colonial. However,
even this concession is a mischaracterization of Colonial, see text at notes 37-39 supra,
and seems unrepresentative of the manner in which Colonial has been interpreted by
other courts. See, e.g., Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678,
682 (D. Wyo. 1975), where the reluctance of the Colonial court to enforce an "amor-
phous" standard which gave no guidelines to exchange members was noted; Wells v. Blythe
& Co., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (MD. Cal. 1972), where the heavy burden of persuasion
put on plaintiffs by the Colonial test was emphasized.
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idea expressed in Colonial that "[a] particular stock exchange rule
could thus play an integral part in SEC regulation notwithstanding
the Commission's decision to take a back-seat role in its promulgation
and enforcement ... "I413 In Colonial, however, this had meant that
the rule must in effect be a substitute for a Commission rule. In Van
Gemert, the court used this same language from Colonial as a basis for
holding that violations of exchange rules will always give a federal
court jurisdiction.' 47
It must be assumed that in so reinterpreting its earlier language
from Colonial, the Second Circuit will now emphasize the practical ef-
fect of allowing such suits, particularly in terms of supplementing SEC
regulation, and is no longer concerned with whether an exchange rule
is technically a substitute for direct SEC action. Buttrey was mentioned
briefly,'" for the proposition that there is an implied private right of
action based on exchange rules. Significantly, it was used to buttress
the jurisdictional theory which the court "found" in Colonial. There is
no mention in Van Gernert, however, of the actual differences in ap-
proach between Colonial and Buttrey.
Nonetheless, in thus balancing Colonial and Buttrey, the Second Cir-
cuit has implied that while it is willing to retreat from the strict in-
terpretation approach of Colonial, it does not completely approve the
free-wheeling position of Buttrey. The lack of definition as to jurisdic-
tional requirements that is an infirmity in Buttrey is avoided while the
standard of investor protection found therein is accepted. Thus, the
Van Gemert court succinctly stated: "The claim for relief is sufficient
for jurisdictional purposes in any event."'" This statement suggests
that the strict requirements of Colonial are now felt unnecessary and
that a broader approach, indicated in Barak and Bitttrey, is more ap-
propriate.
Having found jurisdiction, the court then examined the question
of whether there was a duty in favor of the plaintiffs which would
serve as the basis of liability. The resemblance to Barak and Buttrey is
evident in the manner in which the court examined the issues of duty
and public liability. The court stressed the position that the Exchange
occupies in relation to the investing public. Central to this relationship
is the public trust in the Exchange, and the public knowledge that a
member must meet certain standards. "[lit is held out to the investing
public that by dealing in securities listed on the New York Stock Ex-
145 520 F.2d at 1380.
1 " Id. at 1381. It is interesting to note that the result reached in Colonial is set
forth in a footnote in Van Gernert (id. at n.14), wherein Colonial is listed along with other
Second Circuit cases dealing generally with the question of federal civil liability, begin-
ning with Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
This effectively glosses over the differences that exist between Colonial on the one
hand and Baird, and now Van Gernert, on the other,
"" 520 F.2d at 1381.
14 ' Id. at 1382. The desire for unanimity prompted the writer of the opinion,
Judge Oakes, to join the majority, although he felt the result could be reached on a
third-party beneficiary theory. Id, at 1328 n.19.
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change the investor will be dealt with fairly and pursuant to law." 15 °
This approach is reminiscent of Borak; 1" yet Van Gemert went one
very „important step beyond. In Borak, the Court concluded that the
Act itself sets up a class to be protected and safeguards this class from
certain harm. 152 In Van Gernert, on the other hand, the rules promul-
gated by the exchanges were viewed as defining the duty of protection;
that is, the rules extend or limit the duties created by the Act. Not all
rules would raise a duty between the exchange and the public. For ex-
ample, "housekeeping" rules, 153 intended merely to govern the rela-
tionship between exchange and member raise no public duties. Thus,
each rule must still be examined to determine public liability.' 54 This
approach is markedly different from that in Buttrey, however, where
the existence of a design for investor protection established both
jurisdiction and potential public liability at once, leaving only the facts
of injury and proximate causation to be decided when the merits of
the case were reached.' 55 Thus, while a plaintiff may still be dismissed
should his suit allege violation of a rule determined to be of the
housekeeping variety, the dismissal will not be for want of jurisdiction
under Van Gemert, as it would have been under Buttrey. He will thus
be given a greater opportunity to prove that a given rule is indeed de-
signed for active investor protection.
Additionally, and more importantly, Van Gernert resolves the
question left unanswered by Buttrey. 156 Under Van Gernert, the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all suits alleging violations of
stock exchange rules. The plaintiff no longer has the option of bring-
ing these suits in a state court. This result buttresses the federal
statutory scheme for the protection of securities investors, since it will
ensure a uniform body of federal case law.' 57
The effects of Van Gernert should be far-reaching. It was decided
by the Second Circuit, which is preeminent in the securities regulation
area. Thus it is probably the final word on a problem that has
plagued the federal courts for several years: whether private parties
have jurisdiction to bring suits alleging violations of stock exchange
rules by member-firms. Moreover, the attention of the federal courts
will now be focused on the question of liability for such violations.
This is the area which remains unsettled after Van Gernert. It can be
"° Id. at 1381.
" I Compare id. with J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964). See text
at notes 79-89 supra.
162 377 U.S. at 432.
' 5 ' See Lowenfels, supra note 100, at 24-28; Shipman, Two Current Questions Con-
cerning Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative
Agency to Negate; Existence far Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. RES. L. REV.
925, 967-68 (1966).
164 See 520 F.2d at 1383-86.
"2
 410 F.2d at 143. See text at notes 90-107 supra.
'"See text at note 110 supra.
122
 See the discussion of federal liability for violation of stock exchange rules in
light of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), in note 108 supra.
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dealt with only on a case-by-case basis, meeting violations of the vari-
ous rules as they are alleged. Nonetheless, a fuller and fairer exposi-
tion can be expected under Van Gernert, because the question will not
be muddled with the properly separate question of jurisdiction to
hear a federal claim, nor will it be clouded by elements of state causes
of action which might be joined with it in a state court. Finally, Van
Gernert is the first circuit court decision to find liability for breach of a
stock exchange rule running between a private party and a non-
member, listed securities issuer. The knowledge that they may be held
liable for damages should introduce a degree of caution into the ac-
tions of listed firms.
CONCLUSION
The issue of whether there shOuld be federal jurisdiction for
suits alleging a violation of stock exchange rules has troubled the
courts for some time. Early attempts at a resolution resulted in the
narrow Colonial approach based on a strict—near literal—inter-
pretation of the 1934 Act. The later approach of Buttrey focused on
the much broader question of investor protection. Van Gemert is the
most recent solution. The approach taken adopts certain aspects of
each of the earlier cases: from Colonial, the emphasis on jurisdiction
and from Buttrey, the concern with investor protection. The clarity of
Van Gemert is a welcome addition to the area of jurisdiction in se-
curities regulation law.
JAMES P. LAUGHLIN
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